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1. A PARTICLE IS NOT AN INDIVIDUAL
Atomism in its latest form is called quantum mechanics. It has
extended its range to comprise, besides ordinary matter, all kinds of
radiation, including light—in brief, all forms of energy, ordinary
matter being one of them. In the present form of the theoiy the
"atoms" are electrons, jorotons, photons, mesons, etc. The generic
name is elementary particle, or merely particle. The term "atom"
has very wisely been retained for chemical atoms, though it has
become a misnomer.
This essay deals with the elementary particle, more particularly
with a certain feature that this concept has acquired—or rather lost
—
in quantum mechanics. I menn this : That the elementary particle is
not an individual; it cannot be identified, it lacks "sameness." The
fact is known to every physicist, but is rarely given any prominence
in surveys readable by nonspccialists. In technical language it is
covered by saying that the particles "obey" new-fangled statistics,
either Einstein-Bose or Fermi-Dirac statistics. The implication, far
from obvious, is that the unsuspected epithet "this" is not quite prop-
erly applicable to, say, an electron, except with caution, in a restricted
sense, and sometimes not at all. My objective here is to explain this
point and to give it the thought it deserves. In order to create a foil
for the discussion, let me summarize in sections 2-5 what we are usually
told about particles and waves in the new physics.
2. CURRENT VIEWS: THE AMALGAMATION OF PARTICLES AND
WAVES
Our image of the material world had been made up of two kinds
of "fittings"—waves and particles. The former were instanced
mainly, if not exclusively, by Maxwell's waves of electromagnetic
energy, comprising such as are used in radio, light, X-rays, and
gamma-rays. Material bodies were said to consist of particles. One
* Reprinted by permission from Endeavour, vol. 9, No. 35, July 1950.
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was also familiar with jets of particles, called corpuscular rays, such
as cathode rays, beta-rays, alpha-rays, anode rays, etc. Particles
would emit and absorb waves. For instance, cathode rays (electrons)
,
when slowed down by colliding with atoms, emit X-rays. The dis-
tinction between particles and waves was, however, considered as
clear-cut as that between a violin and its sound. An examinee who
alleged cathode rays to be waves, or X-rays to be jets of particles,
would have got very bad marks.
In the new setting of ideas the distinction has vanished, because it
was discovered that all particles have also wave properties, and vice
versa. Neither of the two concepts must be discarded ; they must be
amalgamated. Which aspect obtrudes itself depends not on the
physical object, but on the experimental device set up to examine it.
A jet of cathode rays, for example, produces in a Wilson cloud chamber
discrete tracks of water droplets—curved tracks if there is a magnetic
jBeld to deflect the electrons, otherwise straight alignments of droplets.
We cannot but interpret them as traces of the paths of single elec-
trons. Yet the same jet, after crossing a narrow tube placed at right
angles to it and containing crystal powder, will produce on a photo-
graphic plate at some distance behind the tube a pattern of concentric
circles. This pattern can be understood in all its details when looked
upon as the interference pattern of waves, and in no other way. In-
deed, it bears a close resemblance to similarly produced X-ray
patterns.
The suspicion arises: are the conical jets that impinge on the
photographic plate and form the pattern of circles really cathode
rays; are they not perhaps secondary X-rays? The suspicion has
to be dismissed, for the whole system of circles can be displaced by
a magnet, while X-rays cannot; moreover, by putting a lead screen
with a small hole in it in the place of the photographic plate, a jetlet
can be isolated from one of the conical jets and made to display any
of the typical particle characters of cathode rays; it will produce
discrete tracks in a cloud chamber; bring about discrete discharges
in a Geiger-Miiller counter ; and charge up a Faraday cage in which
it is intercepted.
A vast amount of experimental evidence clinches the conviction that
wave characteristics and particle characteristics are never encountered
singly, but always in a union ; they form different aspects of the same
phenomenon, and indeed of all physical phenomena. The union is not
a loose or superficial one. It would be quite unsatisfactory to consider
cathode rays to consist both of particles and of waves. In the early
days of the new theory it was suggested that the particles might be
singular spots within the waves, actually singularities in the meaning
of the mathematician. The white crests on a moderately rough sea
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would be a fairly adequate simile. The idea was very soon abandoned.
It seems that both concepts, that of waves and that of particles, have
to be modified considerably, so as to attain a true amalgamation.
3. CURRENT VIEWS: THE NATURE OF WAVES
The waves, so we are told, must not be regarded as quite real waves.
It is true that they produce interference patterns—which is the crucial
test that in the case of light had removed all doubts as to the reality of
the waves. However, we are now told that all waves, including light,
ought rather to be looked upon as ''probability waves." They are only
a mathematical device for computing the probability of finding a
particle in certain conditions, for instance (in the above example), the
probability of an electron hitting the photographic plate within a
small specified area. There it is registered by acting on a gi'ain of
silver bromide. The interference pattern is to be regarded as a statis-
tical registration of the impinging electrons. The waves are in this
context sometimes referred to as guiding waves—guiding or directing
the particles on their paths. The guidance is not to be regarded as a
rigid one ; it merely constitutes a probability. The clear-cut pattern
is a statistical result, its clefiniteness being due to the enormous number
of particles.
Here I cannot refrain from mentioning an objection which is too
obvious not to occur to the reader. Something that influences the
physical behavior of something else must not in any respect be called
less real than the something it influences—whatever meaning we may
give to the dangerous epithet "real." It is certainly useful to recall
at times that all quantitative models or images conceived by the physi-
cist are, epistemologically, only mathematical devices for computing
observable events, but I cannot see that this applies more to, say,
light waves than to, say, oxygen molecules.
4. CURRENT VIEWS: THE NATURE OF PARTICLES (UNCERTAINTY
RELATION)
As regards the modification required in the concept of a particle,
the stress is on Heisenberg's uncertainty relation. The so-called
classical mechanics hinged on Galileo's and Newton's discovery that
the thing which in a moving body is determined at any instant by the
other bodies in its environment is only and precisely its acceleration,
or, in mathematical terms, the second derivatives with respect to time
of the coordinates. The first derivatives, commonly called the ve-
locity, are therefore to be included in the description of the momentary
state of the body, together with the coordinates themselves which
label its momentary place in space or "whereness" (or ubiety, to use
an antiquated but convenient word). Thus, to describe the momen-
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tary state of a particle, two independent data were required : its co-
ordinates and their first time derivatives, or ubiety and velocity.
According to the new theory less is required, and less is obtainable.
Either of the two data can be given with arbitrary accuracy, provided
that no store is set on the other, but both cannot be known together
with absolute precision. One may not even conceive of both as having
absolutely sharp values at the same instant. They mutually blur each
other, as it were. Broadly speaking, the product of the latitudes of
their respective inaccuracies cannot be reduced below a fixed constant.
For an electron, this constant happens to be about 1 if the uni'ts
centimeter and second are used. Thus, if the velocity of an electron
is considered sharp with a latitude of only 1 centimeter per second,
its location has to be considered as blurred within the latitude of 1
centimeter. The strangeness does not lie in the mere existence of
inaccuracies, for the particle might be a thing of vague and change-
able extension, within which slightly different velocities prevailed at
different spots. Then, however, a sharp location or ubiety would
probably entail a sharply defined velocity and vice versa. Actually
it is just the other way round.
5. CURRENT VIEWS: THE MEANING OF THE UNCERTAINTY
RELATION
Two links connect this strange and certainly very fundamental
statement to other parts of the theory. It can be arrived at by de-
claring that a particle is equivalent to its guiding wave, and has
no characteristics save those indicated by the guiding wave according
to a certain code. The code is simple enough. The ubiety is indi-
cated by the extension of the wave, the latitude in the velocity by the
range of wave numbers. "Wave number" is short for reciprocal of
the wavelength. Each wave number corresponds to a certain velocity
proportional to it. That is the code. It is a mathematical truism
that the smaller a wave group, the wider is the (minimum) spread of
its wave numbers.
Alternatively, we may scrutinize the experimental procedure for
determining either the ubiety or the velocity. Any such measuring
device implies a transfer of energy between the particle and some
measuring instrument—eventually the observer himself, who has to
take a reading. This means an actual physical interference with the
particle. The disturbance cannot be arbitrarily reduced, because
energy is not exchanged continuously but in portions. We are given
to understand that, when measuring one of the two items, ubiety or
velocity, we interfere with the other the more violently the higher
the precision we aim at. We blur its value within a latitude inversely
proportional to the latitude of error allowed in the first.
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In both explanations the wording seems to suggest that the uncer-
tainty or lack of precision refers to the attainable knowledge about a
particle rather than to its nature. Indeed, by saying that we disturb
or change a measurable physical quantity we logically imply that it
has certain values before and after our interference, whether we know
them or not. And in the first explanation, involving the wave, if we
call it a guiding wave how should it guide the particle on its path, if the
I)article has not got a path ? If we say the wave indicates the probabil-
ity of finding the particle at A, or at B, or at C—this seems to imply
that the particle is at one, and one only, of these places ; and similarly
for the velocity. (Actually the wave does indicate both probabilities
simultaneously, one by its extension, the other by its wave numbers.)
However, the current view does not accept either ubiety or velocity as
permanent objective realities. It stresses the word "finding." Finding
tlie particle at point A does not imply that it has been there before.
We are more or less given to understand that our measuring device
has brought it there or "concentrated" it at that point, while at the
same time we have disturbed its velocity. And tliis does not imply
that the velocity "had" a value. We have only disturbed or changed
the probability of finding this or that value of the velocity if we
measure it. The implications as to "being" or "having" are miscon-
ceptions, to be blamed on language. Positivist philosophy is invoked
to tell us that we must not distinguish between the knowledge we
can obtain of a physical object and its actual state. The two are one.
6. CRITICISM OF THE UNCERTAINTY RELATION
I will not discuss here that tenet of positivist philosophy. I fully
agree that the uncertainty relation has nothing to do with incomplete
knowledge. It does not reduce the amount of information attainable
about a particle as compared with views held previously. The conclu-
sion is that these views were wrong and we must give them up. We
must not believe that the completer description they demanded about
what is really going on in the physical world is conceivable, but in
practice unobtainable. This would mean clinging to the old view.
Still, it does not necessarily follow that we must give up speaking and
thinking in terms of what is really going on in the physical world. It
has become a convenient habit to picture it as a reality. In everyday
life we all follow this habit, even those philosophers who opposed it
theoretically, such as Bishop Berkeley, Such theoretical controversy
is on a different plane. Physics has nothing to do with it. Physics
takes its start from everyday experience, which it continues by more
subtle means. It remains akin to it, does not transcend it generically,
it cannot enter into another realm. Discoveries in physics cannot in
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themselves—so I believe—have the authority of forcing us to put an
end to the habit of picturing the physical world as a reality.
I believe the situation is this. We have taken over from previous
theory the idea of a particle and all the technical language concerning
it. This idea is inadequate. It constantly drives our mind to ask
information which has obviously no significance. Its imaginative
structure exhibits features which are alien to the real particle. An
adequate picture must not trouble us with this disquieting urge; it
must be incapable of picturing more than there is ; it must refuse any
further addition. Most people seem to think that no such picture can
be found. One may, of course, point to the circumstantial evidence
(which I am sorry to say is not changed by this essay) that in fact
none has been found. I can, however, think of some reasons for this,
apart from the genuine intricacy of the case. The palliative, taken
from positivist philosophy and purporting to be a reasonable way out,
was administered fairly early and authoritatively. It seemed to re-
lieve us from the search for what I should call real understanding;
it even rendered the endeavor suspect, as betraying an unphilosophical
mind—the mind of a child who regretted the loss of its favorite toy
(the picture or model) and would not realize that it was gone forever.
As a second point, I submit that the difficulty may be intimately con-
nected with the principal subject of this paper, to which I shall now
turn without further delay. The uncertainty relation refers to the
particle. The particle, as we shall see, is not an identifiable individual.
It may indeed well be that no individual entity can be conceived which
would answer the requirements of the adequate picture stated above.
It is not at all easy to realize this lack of individuality and to find
words for it. A symptom is that the probability interpretation, unless
it is expressed in the most highly technical language of mathematics,
seems to be vague as to whether the wave gives information about one
particle or about an ensemble of particles. It is not always quite clear
whether it indicates the probability of finding "the" particle or of
finding "a" particle, or indicates the likely or average number of par-
ticles in, say, a given small volume. Moreover, the most popular view
on probability tends to obliterate these differences. It is true that
exact mathematical tools are available to distinguish between them.
A point of general interest is involved, which I will explain. A
method of dealing with the problem of many particles was indicated
in 1926 by the present writer. The method uses waves in many-dimen-
sional space, in a manifold of 3iV dimensions, N being the number of
particles. Deeper insight led to its improvement. The step leading
to this improvement is of momentous significance. The many-dimen-
sional treatment has been superseded by so-called second quantization,
which is mathematically equivalent to uniting into one three-dimen-
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sional formulation the cases iV=0, 1, 2, 3 . . . (to infinity) of the
many-dimensional treatment. This highly ingenious device includes
the so-called new statistics, with which we shall have to deal below in
much simpler terms. It is the only precise formulation of the views
now held, and the one that is always used. What is so very significant
in our present context is that one cannot avoid leaving indeterminate
the number of the particles dealt with. It is thus obvious that they
are not individuals.
7. THE NOTION OF A PIECE OF MATTER
I wish to set forth a view on matter and the material universe, to
which Ernst Mach [1],^ Bertrand Russell [2], and others were led by
a careful analysis of concepts. It differs from the popular view. We
are, however, not concerned with the psychological origin of the con-
cept of matter but with its epistemological analysis. The attitude is
so simple that it can hardly claim complete novelty; some pre-
Socratics, including the materialist Democritus [3], were nearer to
it than were the great men who resuscitated science and molded it
during the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries.
According to this view, a piece of matter is the name we give to a
continuous string of events that succeed each other in time, immedi-
ately successive ones being as a rule closely similar. The single event
is an inextricable complex of sensates, of associated memory images,
and of expectations associated with the former two. The sensates
prevail in the case of an unknown object, say a distant white patch on
the road, which might be a stone, snow, salt, a cat or a dog, a white
shirt or blouse, a handkerchief. Even so, within the ensuing string
of events we usually know from general experience how to discount
the changes caused by motions of our own body, in particular of our
direction of sight. As soon as the nature of the object is recognized,
images and expectations begin to prevail. The latter concern sensa-
tions as hard, soft, heavy, flexible, rough, smooth, cold, salty, etc.,
associated with the image of touching and handling ; they also concern
spontaneous movements or noises such as barking, mewing, shouting,
etc. It should be noted that I am not speaking of our thoughts or con-
siderations about the object, but of what forms part and parcel of
our perception of it—of what it is to us. However, the limit is not
sharp. As our familiarity with a piece of matter grows, and in par-
ticular as we approach its scientific aspect, the range of expectations
in regard to it widens, eventually to include all the information science
has ascertained, e. g., melting point, solubility, electric conductivity,
density, chemical and crystalline structure, and so on. At the same
time, the momentary sensational core recedes in relevance the more
* Numbers ia brackets refer to authorities cited at the end of this article.
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the object becomes familiar to ns, whether by scientific knowledge or
by everyday use.
8. INDIVIDUALITY OR "SAMENESS"
After a certain wealth of association has come to outshine the core
of sensates, the latter is no longer needed to keep the complex together.
It persists even when the contact of our senses with the object tem-
porarily ceases. And more than that: the complex is latently con-
served even when the whole string is interrupted by our turning away
from the object to others and forgetting all about it. Indeed, this is
not exceptional, but a rule which—since we sometimes sleep—has no
exception. But we have adopted the useful device of filling these gaps.
We supplement the missing parts of the strings relating to pieces of
matter in our nearer and farther surroundings, to cover the periods
when we neither watch them nor think of them. When a familiar
object re-enters our ken, it is usually recognized as a continuation of
previous appearances, as being the same thing. The relative perma-
nence of individual pieces of matter is the most momentous feature of
both everyday life and scientific experience. If a familiar article, say
an earthenware jug, disappears from your room, you are quite sure
somebody must have taken it away. If after a time it reappears, you
may doubt whether it really is the same one—^breakable objects in such
circumstances are often not. You may not be able to decide the issue,
but you will have no doubt that the doubtful sameness has an indis-
putable meaning—that there is an unambiguous answer to your query.
So firm is our belief in the continuity of the unobserved parts of the
strings I
No doubt the notion of individuality of pieces of matter dates from
time immemorial. I suppose animals must have it in some way, and
a dog, when seeking for his ball that has been hidden, displays it very
plainly. Science has taken it over as a matter of course. It has re-
fined it so as safely to embrace all cases of apparent disappearance of
matter. The idea that a log which burns away first turns into fire,
then into ashes and smoke, is not alien to the primitive mind. Science
has substantiated it ; though the appearance in bulk may change, the
ultimate constituents of the matter do not. This was (in spite of his
occasional skepticism mentioned above) the teaching of Democritus.
Neither he nor Dalton doubted that an atom which was originally pres-
ent in the block of wood is afterward either in the ashes or in the
smoke.
9. THE BEARING ON ATOMISM
In the new turn of atomism that began with the papers of Heisen-
berg and of de Broglie in 1925 such an attitude has to be abandoned.
This is the most startling revelation emerging from the ensuing de-
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velopmeiit, and the feature which in the long run is bound to have the
most important consequences. If we wish to retain atomism we are
forced by observed facts to deny the ultimate constituents of matter
the character of identifiable individuals. Until recently, atomists of
all ages, for all I know, had transferred that characteristic from visi-
ble and palpable pieces of matter to the atoms, which they could not see
or touch or observe singly. Now we do observe single particles; we
see their tracks in the cloud chamber and in photographic emulsions;
we register the practically simultaneous discharges caused by a single
swift particle in two or three Geiger counters placed at several yards'
distance from each other. Yet we must deny the particle the dignity
of being an absolutely identifiable individual. Formerly, if a physi-
cist w^ere asked what stuff the atoms themselves were made of, he might
smile and shirk the answer. If the inquirer insisted on the question
whether he might imagine them as small unchangeable bits of ordinary
matter, he would get the smiling reply that there was no point in doing
so but that it would do no harm. The formerly meaningless question
has now gained significance. The answer is definitely in the nega-
tive. An atom lacks the most primitive property we associate with a
piece of matter in ordinary life. Some philosophers of the past, if
the case could be put to them, would say that the modern atom con-
sists of no stuff at all but is pure shape.
10. THE MEANING OF THE NEW STATISTICS
We must at last proceed to give the reasons for this change of atti-
tude in a more comprehensible form than at the end of section 6. It
rests on the so-called new statistics. There are two of them. One is
the Bose-Einstein statistics, whose novelty and relevance were first
stressed by Einstein. The other is the Fermi-Dirac statistics, of
which the most pregnant expression is Pauli's exclusion principle. I
shall try to explain the new statistics, and its relation to the old classi-
cal or Boltzmann statistics, to those who have never heard about such
things and perhaps may be puzzled by what "statistics" means in this
context. I shall use an instance from everyday life. It may seem
childishly simple, particularly because we have to choose small num-
bers—actually 2 and 3—in order to make the arithmetic surveyable.
Apart from this, the illustration is completely adequate and covers
the actual situation.
Three schoolboys, Tom, Dick, and Harry, deserve a reward. The
teacher has two rewards to distribute among them. Before doing so,
he wishes to realize for himself how many different distributions are
at all possible. This is the only question we investigate (we are not
interested in his eventual decision). It is a statistical question: to
count the number of different distributions. The point is that the
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answer depends on the nature of the rewards. Three different kinds
of reward will illustrate the three kinds of statistics.
(a) The two rewards are two memorial coins with portraits of New-
ton and Shakespeare respectively. The teacher may give Newton
either to Tom or to Dick or to Harry, and Shakespeare either to Tom
or to Dick or to Harry. Thus there are 3 times 3, that is 9, different
distributions (classical statistics).
(b) The two rewards are two shilling-pieces (which, for our pur-
pose, we must regard as indivisible quantities) . They can be given to
two different boys, the third going without. In addition to these three
possibilities there are three more: either Tom or Dick or Harry re-
ceives 2 shillings. Thus there are six different distributions (Bose-
Einstein statistics).
(c) The two rewards are two vacancies in the football team that is
to play for the school. In this case two boys can join the team, and
one of the three is left out. Thus there are three different distribu-
tions (Fermi-Dirac statistics).
Let me mention right away: the rewards represent the particles,
two of the same kind in every case ; the boys represent states the par-
ticle can assume. Thus, "Newton is given to Dick" means : the par-
ticle Newton takes on the state Dick.
Notice that the counting is natural, logical, and indisputable in
every case. It is uniquely determined by the nature of the object
—
memorial coins, shillings, mejnberships. They are of different cate-
gories. Memorial coins are individuals distinguished from one an-
other. Shillings, for all intents and purposes, are not, but they are
still capable of being owned in the plural. It makes a difference
whether you have 1 shilling, or 2 or 3. There is no point in two boys
exchanging their shillings. It does change the situation, however,
if one boy gives up his shilling to another. With memberships, neither
has a meaning. You can either belong to a team or not. You cannot
belong to it twice over.
Experimental evidence proves that statistical counts referring to
elementary particles must never follow the pattern (a), but must fol-
low either (6) or (c). Some hold that for all genuinely elementary
particles (<?) is competent. Such particles, electrons for instance, cor-
respond to membership in a club; I mean to the abstract notion of
membership, not to the members. Any person eligible to membership
in that club represents a well-defined state an electron can take on.
If the person is a member, that means there is an electron in that par-
ticular state. According to Pauli's exclusion principle, there can
never be more than one electron in a particular state. Our simile
renders this by declaring double membership meaningless—as in most
clubs it would be. In the course of time the list of members changes.
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and membership is now attached to other persons : the electrons have
gone over into other states. Wliether you can, in a loose way, speak
of a certain membership going over from Dick to Tom, thence from
Tom to Harry, etc., depends on the circumstances. They may suggest
this view, or they may not, but never in an absolute fashion. In this
our simile is perfect, for it is the same with an electron. Moreover,
it is quite appropriate to consider the number of members as fluctuat-
ing. Indeed, electrons too are created and annihilated.
The example may seem odd and inverted. One might think, "Why
cannot the people be the electrons and various clubs their states?
That would be so much more natural." The physicist regrets, but he
camiot oblige. And this is just the salient point : the actual statistical
behavior of electrons cannot be illustrated by any simile that rep-
resents them by identifiable things. That is why it follows from their
actual statistical behavior that they are not identifiable things.
The (b), illustrating Einstein-Bose statistics, is competent for light
quanta (photons), inter alia. It hardly needs discussion. It does not
strike us as so strange for the very reason that it includes light, i. e.,
eJectromagnetic energy; and energy, in prequantum times, had always
been thought of in very much the way our simile represents it, viz, as
having quantity, but no individuality.
11, RESTRICTED NOTION OF IDENTITY
The most delicate question is that of the states of, say, an electron.
They are, of course, to be defined not classically, but in the light of
the uncertainty relation. The rigorous treatment referred to at the
end of section 6 is not really based on the notion of "state of one elec-
tron" but on that of "state of the assembly of electrons." The whole
list of members of the club, as it were, has to be envisaged together
—
or rather several membership lists, corresponding to the several kinds
of particles that go to compose the physical system under considera-
tion. I mention this, not to go into details about it, but because, taken
rigorously, the club simile has two flaws. First, the possible states
of an electron (which we had assimiliated to the persons eligible for
membership) are not absolutely defined; they depend on the arrange-
ment of the—actual or imagined—experiment. Given this arrange-
ment, the states are well-defined individuals, which the electrons are
not. They also form—and this is the second flaw of the simile—
a
well-ordered manifold. That is, there is a meaning in speaking of
neighboring states as against such as are more remote from each other.
Moreover, I believe it is true to say that this order can be conceived in
such a fashion that, as a rule, whenever one occupied state ceases to be
occupied, a neighboring state becomes occupied.
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This explains that, in favorable circumstances, long strings of suc-
cessively occupied states may be produced, similar to those contem-
plated in sections 7 and 8. Such a string gives the impression of an
identifiable individual, just as in the case of any object in our daily
surrounding. It is in this way that we must look upon the tracks in
the cloud chamber or in a photographic emulsion, and on the (prac-
tically) simultaneous discharges of Geiger counters set in a line,
which discharges we say are caused by the same particle passing one
counter after another. In such cases it would be extremely incon-
venient to discard this terminology. There is, indeed, no reason to
ban it, provided we are aware that, on sober experimental grounds,
the sameness of a particle is not an absolute concept. It has only a
restricted significance and breaks down completely in some cases.
In what circumstances this restricted sameness will manifest itself
is fairly obvious: namely, when only few states are occupied in the
region of the state-manifold with which we are concerned, or, in other
words, when the occupied states are not too crowded in that region,
or when occupation is a rare event—the terms "few," "crowded," and
"rare" all referring to the state-manifold. Otherwise, the strings
intermingle inextricably and reveal the true situation. In the last
section we shall formulate the quantitative condition for the prevailing
of restricted individuality. Now we ask what happens when it is
obliterated.
12. CROWDEDNESS AND WAVE ASPECT
One gains the impression that according as the individuality of the
particles is wiped out by crowding, the particle aspect becomes alto-
gether less and less expedient and has to be replaced by the wave
aspect. For instance, in the electronic shell of an atom or molecule the
crowding is extreme, almost all the states within a certain region being
occupied by electrons. The same holds for the so-called free electrons
inside a metal. Indeed, in both cases the particle aspect becomes en-
tirely incompetent. On the other hand, in an ordinary gas the mole-
cules are extremely rare in the wide region of states over which they
spread. No more than one state in 10,000 or so is occupied. And in-
deed, the theory of gases, based on the particle aspect, was able to
attain great perfection long before the wave nature of ordinary mat-
ter was discovered. (In the last remark I have been speaking of the
molecules as if they were ultimate particles ; this is legitimate as far
as their translatory motion is concerned.)
It is tempting to assign to the two rivals, the particle aspect and the
wave aspect, full competences in the limiting cases of extreme "rare-
faction" and extreme "crowding" respectively. This would separate
them, as it were, with only some sort of transition required for the
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intermediate region. This idea is not entirely wrong, but it is also
far from correct. One may remember the interference patterns re-
ferred to in section 2 in evidence of the wave nature of the electron.
They can be obtained w ith an arbitrarily faint bundle of cathode rays,
provided the exposure is prolonged. Thus a typical wave phenomenon
is produced here, irrespective of crowding. Another instance is this.
xV competent theoretical investigation of the collision of two particles,
whether of the same or of different kind, has to take account of their
wave nature. The results are duly applied to the collisions of cosmic-
ray particles w^ith atomic nuclei in the atmosphere, both being ex-
tremely rarefied in every sense of the word. But perhaps this is triv-
ial; it only means that even an isolated particle, which gives us the
illusion of transitory individuality, must yet not be likened to a classi-
cal particle. It remains subject to the uncertainty relation, of which
the only tolerable image is the guiding wave group.
13. THE CONDITION FOR THE PARTICLE ASPECT
The following is the quantitative condition for strings to develop
which counterfeit individuals and suggest the particle aspect: the
product of the momentum f and the average distance I between neigh-
boring particles must be fairly large compared with Planck's constant
A; thus
Vl» h.
(The momentum j)—and not the velocity—is the thing we should
really have referred to when, in sections 4 and 5, we dealt with the
uncertainty relation
; p is simply the product of the mass and the ve-
locity, unless the latter is comparable with that of light.)
A large I means a low density in ordinary space. What matters,
however, is the density in the manifold of states—or phase space, to
use the technical term. That is why the momentum p comes in. It is
gratifying to remember that those very obvious strings—visible tracks
in the cloud chamber or in the photographic emulsion, and simul-
taneous discharges of alined counters—are all produced by particles
with comparatively very large momentum.
The above relation is familiar from the theory of gases, where it
expresses the condition which must be fulfilled in very good approxi-
mation in order that the old classical particle theory of gases should
apply in very good approximation. This theory has to be modified
according to quantum theory when the temperature is very low and at
the same time the density very high, so that the product pi is no longer
very large compared with h. This modification is called the theory
of degenerate gases, of which the most famous application is that by
A. Sommerfeld to the electrons inside a metal; we have mentioned
them before as an instance of extreme crowding.
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There is the following connection between our relation and the un-
certainty relation. The latter allows one at any moment to distinguish
a particle from its neighbors by locating it with an error considerably
smaller than the average distance I. But this entails an uncertainty in
p. On account of it, as the particle moves on, the uncertainty in the
location grows. If one demands that it still remain well below I after
the particle has covered the distance Z, one arrives precisely at the
above relation.
But again I must warn of a misconception which the preceding
sentences might suggest, viz, that crowding only prevents us from
registering the identity of a particle, and that we mistake one particle
for the other. The point is that they are not individuals which could
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